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Nominee corporations are often used in real estate trans-
actions to hold title to property for the benefit of the actual
developer.' The typical reasons for forming these corporations
are to avoid personal liability, circumvent usury laws, and con-
ceal the identity of a developer. The nominee corporation will
usually enter into an agreement with the developer to hold
title to the property as the nominee or agent of the developer
and to treat the property and all revenues and expenses of the
property as belonging to the developer.
If, however, the nominee corporation is treated as the
"true" owner of the property for income tax purposes, the
earnings will be subject to a double tax: first, when earned by
the corporation; and second, when distributed as dividends to
the shareholders.2 In addition, the nominee corporation,
rather than the developer, will be entitled to the various
deductions that result from the ownership and operation of the
property.3 Lastly, the conveyance of the property from the
nominee corporation to the developer may be treated as a taxa-
* This article is a condensed version of Chapter 2C, "The Use of Nominee
Corporations in Real Estate Financing Transactions," in the treatise REAL ESTATE
FINANCING published by Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. Chapter 2C also contains, as
appendices, forms for a Certificate of Incorporation of a nominee corporation, a
Secretary's Certificate, and an Agreement between a nominee corporation and
developer.
** Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law, Boulder, Colorado.
Counsel to Ireland, Stapleton, Pryor & Pascoe, P.C., Denver, Colorado. Visiting
Professor of Law 1992-93, University of Puget Sound School of Law.
1. See generally Robert N. Cook, Straw Men in Real Estate Transactions, 25
WASH. U. L.Q. 232 (1940); Jerome Kurtz & Charles G. Kopp, Taxability of Straw
Corporations in Real Estate Transactions, 22 TAx LAw. 647 (1969); Marvin F. Milich,
Incorporation to Circumvent Usury Laws: Associated Tax Problems and Law, 14 J.
CORP. L. 527 (1989); Steven J. Stogen & David L. Jones, Straw and Nominee
Corporations in Real Estate Shelter Transactions, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 403.
2. See I.R.C. § 301 (1986).
3. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162 (1986) (business deductions); see also id. § 163 (interest
deductions) and §§ 167, 168 (depreciation deductions).
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ble event.4 To sustain the treatment of the developer as the
"true" owner of the property for income tax purposes, develop-
ers who have used nominee corporations have argued that
these corporations should be treated as "nonentities" for tax
purposes5 or, alternatively, as agents acting on behalf of the
developers of the property.6
An individual could be substituted for the nominee corpo-
ration for any of the purposes described above, other than the
avoidance of usury limits. The use of an individual as a nomi-
nee or agent, however, may result in significant problems. For
example, an individual might refuse to convey the property to
the developer when the developer requests the conveyance.
Moreover, an individual might convey the property that he or
she holds as an agent to a third party. Finally, an individual
acting as an agent or a nominee might have creditors who
attempt to levy on the property held by the agent or nominee.
Because of these problems, and because individuals are subject
to usury limits, a developer will prefer to use a nominee cor-
poration, particularly a nominee corporation controlled by the
developer.
If a nominee corporation is considered a nonentity or an
agent, any expenses paid while the project property is held by
the nominee corporation can be deducted or capitalized by the
developer.7 If, however, the nominee corporation is considered
an entity and not an agent, the expenses incurred while the
property is held by the nominee corporation can only be
deducted or capitalized by the nominee corporation, and the
payment of these expenses by the developer may be considered
capital contributions by the developer to the nominee corpora-
tion.' Any income received from the property during the time
it is held by the nominee corporation will be treated as the
developer's income if the nominee corporation is considered a
nonentity or an agent. On the other hand, if the nominee cor-
poration is considered an entity and not an agent, it will be
regarded as the owner of the income derived from the property
4. See, e.g., Carver v. United States, 412 F.2d 233 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Preferred
Properties, Inc- v. Comm'r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 68 (1976); Bolger v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 760
(1973).
5. See infra part II.A.
6. See infra part II.B.
7. See Worth Steamship Corp. v. Comm'r, 7 T.C. 654 (1946).
8. See, e.g., Heaton v. Comm'r, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1412 (1989); Householder v.
Comm'r, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 381-3 (1989).
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during the time the property is held by the nominee corpora-
tion. The problem presented is getting the income out of the
hands of the nominee corporation and into the hands of the
developer without incurring a second tax on the income.
A conveyance to the developer of the property held by the
nominee corporation will not be considered a taxable event if
the nominee corporation is considered a nonentity or an agent
of the developer. If, however, the nominee corporation is con-
sidered an entity and not an agent of the developer, then the
conveyance of the property to the developer could be consid-
ered, in the appropriate situation, a dividend paid by the nomi-
nee corporation to the developer. In the alternative, the
conveyance of the property by the nominee corporation to the
developer might be treated as a sale to the developer. Lastly,
the conveyance of the property by the nominee corporation to
the developer might be considered a liquidation of the nominee
corporation rather than a dividend or a sale.
This Article traces the development of the nonentity and
agency approaches to the treatment of nominee corporations.
The nonentity approach had a short lifespan and is of little use
today.9 The agency approach, in contrast, experienced a period
of development that resulted in a complex six-factor test that
was employed in at least three circuits. 10 When a conflict in
the application of the six-factor test developed, the Supreme
Court in Commissioner v. Bollinger" enunciated a different
approach and established a new, more workable standard.'2
This Article explores the limitations of that standard as well as
its practical application for planners. 3
II. THE ROAD TO BOLLINGER
Prior to Bollinger, the federal courts addressed two theo-
ries through which developers could be treated, for income tax
purposes, as the owners of property, the title to which was
held by nominee corporations: the nonentity theory and the
agency theory. These theories are addressed in turn.
9. See itf a part II.A.
10. See infra part II.B.
11. 435 U.S. 340 (1988).
12. See infra part III.B.
13. See infra parts IV. and V.
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A. The Nonentity Approach
While a nominee corporation may hold record title to a
real estate development, the developer would like to person-
ally have the income tax benefits flowing from the develop-
ment and ownership of the real estate. One means of
achieving this goal is for the developer to successfully assert
that the nominee corporation should be disregarded for income
tax purposes.' 4 The developer will assert "that because of its
limited purpose, the [nominee] corporation [is] a mere fig-
mentary agent which should be disregarded in the assessment
of taxes."' 5 As a practical matter, the developer will assert
that the nominee corporation does not exist for income tax
purposes because the nominee neither develops nor operates
the real estate, but only holds the real estate for a limited inci-
dental purpose.
Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner'6 presented the
Supreme Court with an opportunity to consider the nonentity
theory. In Moline, a creditor of Mr. Thompson suggested that
he convey certain of his individually owned real estate to
Moline Properties, Inc., which would assume the outstanding
mortgages on this real estate. Mr. Thompson did as the credi-
tor suggested and received in return almost all of the stock of
the corporation. He transferred this stock to a voting trustee
appointed by the creditor. The stock was to be held as security
for a loan to Mr. Thompson that was used to pay back taxes on
the real estate conveyed to the corporation. In 1933, this loan
was repaid, the mortgages on the real estate were refinanced
with a different mortgagee, and control of the stock of Moline
Properties, Inc., reverted to Mr. Thompson. The real estate
held by the corporation was sold in three parcels, one each in
1934, 1935, and 1936. The proceeds from these sales were
received by Mr. Thompson and deposited in his bank account.' 7
Until 1933, the corporation's business consisted of the
assumption of the mortgages on the real estate conveyed to it,
the defense of certain condemnation proceedings, and the insti-
tution of a suit to remove restrictions imposed on the property
by a prior deed. The expenses of the suit were paid by Mr.
14. See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); Paymer v. Comm'r,
150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945).
15. Moline, 319 U.S. at 438.
16. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
17. Id. at 437.
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Thompson. In 1934, a portion of the real estate owned by the
corporation was leased for use as a parking lot. The corpora-
tion kept no books, maintained no bank account, and owned no
other assets during its existence.' 8
In deciding who should be taxed, the Supreme Court held
that the corporation, rather than Mr. Thompson, was taxable
on the gain from the sales of the real estate titled in the name
of the corporation, stating:
The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in
business life. Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage
under the law of the state of incorporation or to avoid or to
comply with the demands of creditors or to serve the crea-
tor's personal or undisclosed convenience, so long as that
purpose is the equivalent of business activity or is followed
by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corpo-
ration remains a separate taxable entity.19
Moline set practitioners and the courts on a quest to deter-
mine how much activity would be permitted before a nominee
corporation was treated for income tax purposes as a separate
taxable entity rather than a nonentity. To the dismay of prac-
titioners, the courts concluded that it took very little activity to
cause a nominee corporation to be treated as a separate taxable
entity rather than a nonentity. For example, in Paymer v.
20tw brCommissioner, two brothers were in a partnership that
owned and managed real estate. The brothers organized two
corporations. The first corporation was called Raymep Realty
Corp., Inc., and the second was called Westrich Realty Corp.
The brothers conveyed to each of these corporations a parcel of
income producing real estate. In return, each of the two part-
ners received half of the stock of each corporation. The broth-
ers conveyed the property to the corporations because one of
them had been a co-signer on a note and a guarantor of an
account, both of which were overdue at the time of the forma-
tion of the corporations and the conveyance of the real estate.
The partners were concerned that the partner who had co-
signed the note and guaranteed the account might be sued and
that the real estate owned by the partnership might be
attached. The formation of the corporations and the convey-
ance of the real estate were executed in order to avoid that
18. Id. at 438.
19. Id. at 438-39.
20. 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945).
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possibility.21
The minutes of a meeting of the directors and stockhold-
ers of each of the corporations at the time of the conveyance
reflected that the corporations existed only to hold title to the
real estate and that the beneficial interest, profits, manage-
ment and control of the real estate was to remain in the indi-
vidual stockholders. From that time forth, the two partners
managed the real estate held in the names of the corporations,
collected the income therefrom, paid the expenses, and depos-
ited all of the money received with respect to the real estate in
the bank account of the partnership. In fact, the partners
treated the real estate exactly the same way they had treated it
when it was partnership property.22
Westrich did nothing with regard to the real estate held in
its name. Raymep, however, obtained a loan of $50,000 for use
with respect to the real estate held in its name. As part of the
security for this loan, it assigned to the lender all of the les-
sor's rights and interest in two leases on the real estate.2 3
The Second Circuit held that Westrich could be treated as
a nonentity, but that the status of Raymep as a separate taxa-
ble entity must be acknowledged, stating:
We think that Raymep was active enough to justify holding
that it did engage in business in 1938. The absence of books,
records and offices and the failure to hold corporate meet-
ings are not decisive on that question. Though Raymep was
organized solely to deter creditors of one of the partners, it
apparently was impossible or impractical to use it solely for
that purpose when it became necessary or desirable to
secure the above-mentioned loan ....
Westrich, however, was at all times but a passive
dummy which did nothing but take and hold the title to the
real estate conveyed to it. It served no business purpose in
connection with the property and was intended to serve only
as a blind to deter the creditors of one of the partners. It
was but a sham to be disregarded for tax purposes.
24
The holding in Paymer is illustrative of the courts' analy-
sis of the nonentity theory. It appears that if a nominee corpo-
ration does absolutely nothing but take title to real estate, it
21. Id. at 336.
22. Id
23. Id.
24. Id. at 336-37.
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may be disregarded and not treated as a separate entity for tax
purposes. If, however, a nominee corporation borrows some
money with respect to the real estate titled in its name and
conveys a security interest to the lender in order to secure the
loan, it will be treated as a separate taxable entity. Because
two of the three purposes of a nominee corporation involve the
borrowing of money and the giving of security for the repay-
ment of the borrowing, it appears that, in most cases, the non-
entity theory will not be available with respect to a nominee
corporation. In Paymer, the borrowing of money and the
granting of security with respect to the borrowing was consid-
ered a business activity.25 In Moline, the Supreme Court held
that if a nominee corporation engages in business activities, it
cannot be ignored and treated as a nonentity for income tax
purposes.26 As a result, the nonentity theory has little value in
the context of real estate transactions.
The federal courts' restrictive application of the nonentity
approach led practitioners to seek another way to have nomi-
nee corporations ignored for the purpose of federal taxation.
B. The Agency Approach
When employing the agency approach, a developer
acknowledges that the nominee corporation is a "real live" cor-
poration for income tax purposes. The developer does not ask
the Internal Revenue Service and the courts to ignore the
existence of the nominee corporation. The developer, however,
asserts that the nominee corporation is an agent of the devel-
oper for income tax purposes. Because the nominee corpora-
tion is an agent of the developer, the developer as principal is
entitled to the income tax benefits and burdens resulting from
the development and ownership of the real estate that the
nominee corporation holds as an agent for the developer.27 In
addition, the conveyance of the subject real estate by the nomi-
nee corporation to the developer is simply a facet of the nomi-
nee corporation carrying out its duties as an agent and has no
independent income tax significance. Under this approach, the
developer will acknowledge that the nominee corporation
should be taxed on the income from the fees it receives for act-
ing as an agent; however, other than the taxation of those fees,
25. Paymer, 150 F.2d at 336-37.
26. Moline, 319 U.S. at 438-39.
27. See generally National Carbide Corp. v. Comm'r, 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
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all income that the nominee corporation derives and all
expenses that it incurs as an agent should be treated as the
income and expenses of the developer as principal.'
The agency approach to the treatment of a nominee corpo-
ration also dates from Moline. In that case, as an alternative
argument, the taxpayer urged that Moline Properties, Inc.,
should be treated as a mere agent for its sole stockholder.' If
it were considered as an agent, the principal would be treated
as having recognized the income received by the agent on his
behalf. The Supreme Court summarily dismissed this argu-
ment, stating that "[t]here was no actual contract of agency,
nor the usual incidents of an agency relationship. Surely the
mere fact of the existence of a corporation with one or several
stockholders, regardless of the corporation's business activities,
does not make the corporation the agent of its stockhold-
ers .... "30
Following the decision in Moline, developers frequently
asserted that the nominee corporation should be treated as an
agent of the "true" owners of the property to which the nomi-
nee corporation acted. This was particularly the case when the
activities of the nominee corporation would clearly prevent
treatment of the nominee corporation as a nonentity. For
example, in Worth Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner,31 the
"nominee" corporation, Worth Steamship Corporation, oper-
ated a steamship called the S.S. Leslie. Clearly, its activities
were well beyond those that might result in the nominee cor-
poration being considered a nonentity. In this case, however,
the three individuals who owned the beneficial interests in the
steamship transferred legal title to the steamship to the corpo-
ration. Only two of the three individuals owned stock in the
corporation, and the percentage of stock ownership of each
individual in the corporation was different than the individ-
ual's beneficial interest in the steamship.32
The corporation's status as an agent for the three individu-
als was well documented. First, a joint venture agreement
among the three individuals reflected that the steamship
would be operated for the benefit of the three individuals. 33
28. See id
29. Moline, 319 U.S. at 440.
30. Id.
31. 7 T.C. 654 (1946).
32. Id. at 658.
33. Id. at 659-60.
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Each individual was to share proportionately in all expenses,
obligations and profits of any kind derived from the operation
or sale of the steamship. Second, the corporation entered into
an agreement with two of the individuals with respect to the
operation of the steamship.' The agreement provided for a
payment to the corporation for all services rendered by it in
the operation of the steamship, and it acknowledged that upon
six months' notice the individuals could terminate the agree-
ment and the corporation would return title to the steamship
to the individuals. Finally, the corporation entered into a "dec-
laration of trust," which acknowledged that the corporation did
not have any beneficial interest, direct or indirect, in the
steamship.35 The "declaration of trust" further provided that
the corporation held record title to the steamship solely as
trustee for the benefit of the individuals, and that upon
demand the corporation would transfer an individual's undi-
vided interest in the steamship to the individual making the
demand or to a corporation designated by the individual.
The Tax Court held that the income and expenses result-
ing from the operation of the steamship were properly treated
as the income and the expenses of the three individuals.'
While the agency relationship in Worth Steamship was well
documented, the relationship was not as clearly established in
other cases.37 This led the Supreme Court in National Carbide
Corp. v. Commissioner3 8 to attempt to fashion a test that could
be used to determine whether a nominee corporation was an
agent of the "true owner."
1. National Carbide and the Six-Factor Test
The Supreme Court's first in depth look at the agency the-
ory occurred in National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner.39
This case involved three wholly owned subsidiaries of Air
Reduction Corporation ("Airco"). The subsidiaries contended
that they were corporate agents of Airco and that the income
from their operations was the income of Airco. Airco used the
subsidiaries as operating companies in its four major fields of
operation. Contracts between Airco and the subsidiaries pro-
34. Id. at 660.
35. Id. at 660-61.
36. Worth Steamship, 7 T.C. at 655.
37. See generally Kurtz & Kopp, supra note 1.
38. 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
39. Id.
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vided that the subsidiaries were employed as agents to manage
and operate plants designed for the manufacture of the prod-
ucts assigned to each subsidiary. In addition, the contracts pro-
vided that the subsidiaries acted as Airco's agents in selling the
output of the plants. Airco furnished working capital, execu-
tive management, and office facilities for its subsidiaries.
They, in turn, agreed to pay Airco all profits derived from
their activities in excess of a nominal six percent on their out-
standing capital stock, which constituted their fees for acting
as agents for Airco.'
The subsidiaries held title to the assets that they used.
Amounts advanced by Airco for the purchase of assets and
working capital were shown on the books of the subsidiaries as
accounts payable to Airco.41 After reviewing these facts and
analyzing Moline, the Court concluded that the subsidiaries
were not agents of Airco and, as a result, were taxable on the
income that they earned.' The Court first indicated that the
mere presence of language in a contract designating one party
as an agent of another was not enough to establish an agency
relationship:
The fact that petitioners were required by contract to turn
over the money received by them to Airco, after deducting
expenses and nominal profits, is no sure indication that they
were mere collection agents. Such an agreement is entirely
consistent with the corporation-sole stockholder relationship
whether or not any agency exists, and with other relation-
ships as well.43
The Supreme Court then went on to identify a series of
factors that should be considered in determining whether the
relationship is a "true" agency relationship:
What we have said does not foreclose a true corporate agent
or trustee from handling the property and income of its
owner-principal without being taxable therefor. Whether
the corporation operates in the name and for the account of
the principal, binds the principal by its actions, transmits
money received to the principal, and whether receipt of
income is attributable to the services of employees of the
principal and to assets belonging to the principal are some of
40. Id. at 424.
41. Id. at 424-26.
42. Id. at 439.
43. National Carbide, 336 U.S. at 436.
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the relevant considerations in determining whether a true
agency exists. If the corporation is a true agent, its relations
with its principal must not be dependent upon the fact that
it is owned by the principal, if such is the case. Its business
purpose must be the carrying on of the normal duties of an
agent. Absence of the factors mentioned above, and the
essentiality of ownership of the corporation to the existence
of any "agency relationship" in the Moline Properties
cas[e], indicate the fallacy of the agency argument made in
[that case].44
The Supreme Court then applied its newly fashioned test to
the facts present in National Carbide.
The same fallacy [as present in Moline] is apparent in the
contention that the petitioners are agents of Airco. They
claim that they should be taxable on net income aggregating
only $1,350, despite the fact that . . . they owned assets
worth nearly 20 million dollars, had net sales of approxi-
mately 22 million dollars, and earned nearly four and one-
half million dollars net. Their employees number in the
thousands. . . . The entire earnings of [the subsidiaries],
except for trifling amounts, are turned over to Airco not
because the latter could command this income if petitioners
were owned by third persons, but because it owns and thus
completely dominates the subsidiaries.... When we referred
to the "usual incidents of an agency relationship" in the
Moline Properties case, we meant just that-not the identity
of ownership and control disclosed by the facts of this case.
45
The decision of the Supreme Court in National Carbide
led the courts and practitioners, when considering whether a
nominee corporation should be treated as an agent, to ask
whether the nominee corporation complied with the six factors
described by the Supreme Court. Specifically, the six factors
were as follows: (1) the nominee corporation must operate in
the name of and for the account of the principal; (2) the princi-
pal must be bound by the actions of the nominee corporation;
(3) the money received by the nominee corporation must be
transmitted to the principal; (4) the nominee corporation's
receipt of income must be attributable to the services of
employees of, and assets belonging to, the principal; (5) the
nominee corporation's relations with the principal cannot be
dependent on the fact that it is owned by the principal; and (6)
44. Id. at 437.
45. Id. at 438-39.
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the nominee corporation's business purpose must be to carry
on the normal duties of an agent.'
This six-factor test was subsequently applied by the courts
in situations where the nominee corporation was wholly owned
by or under common control with the developer, and in situa-
tions in which the nominee corporation was neither wholly
owned nor under common control. The complex application of
this test resulted in divergent interpretations in the federal
courts and the Tax Court.
2. Application of the Six-Factor Test
a. Application of the Six-Factor Test to Corporations That
Are Wholly Owned By or Under Common Control
With a Developer
In Roccaforte v. Commissioner,47 the stock of a nominee
corporation was wholly owned by the investors in a partner-
ship for which the corporation purported to be the agent. In
fact, the investors each owned shares of stock in the corpora-
tion in precisely the same proportions as their original owner-
ship interests in the partnership. The sole purpose of the
formation of the nominee corporation was to allow the part-
nership's institutional lenders to make loans for the construc-
tion of an apartment development at interest rates that were
in excess of the rate that could be charged to a partnership or
an individual under the state's usury laws. The nominee cor-
poration entered into agency and nominee agreements with the
partnership. Those agreements provided that the nominee cor-
poration could only act at the direction of the partnership and
hold title to the real estate on which the apartments were built
as an agent of the partnership. The nominee corporation was
held out to third parties as an agent of the partnership. Lend-
ers recognized that the nominee corporation's status was that
of an agent of the partnership.4
Additionally, the partnership was bound by the nominee
corporation's actions except, of course, with respect to the bor-
rowing for the construction of the apartment development. In
that respect, "[t]he corporation was primarily liable on the
mortgages and to that extent can be said to be the 'principal'
46. Id. at 437.
47. 77 T.C. 263 (1981), rev'd, 708 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983).
48. Id. at 284-85.
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with respect to those mortgages. '49 The no ~inee corporation
maintained a checking account. The account, however, was
only used to deposit each of the construction loan advances and
to make payments to the building contractor. Neither the pro-
ceeds from the operation of the apartment development nor
any of the capital contributions of the partners were ever
deposited in the account of the nominee corporation.' The
nominee corporation never had any employees of its own. Its
only asset was record title to the real estate on which the
apartment development was built.51
The agency and nominee agreements further provided that
equitable title to the real estate was in the partnership, and
that the equity needed to acquire the real estate and to secure
the financing for the apartment development came from the
partners. The partners were also responsible for additional
contributions to meet excess construction costs and losses
incurred by the apartment development. Generally, the
agency and nominee agreements endowed the nominee corpo-
ration with the specific indicia of an agent for the
partnership.52
The Tax Court held that the nominee corporation was an
agent of the partnership, and, as a result, the partners were
entitled to deduct the losses generated by the operation of the
apartment development.5" The Tax Court determined that the
relationship between the nominee corporation and the part-
nership satisfied five of the six National Carbide factors, but
noted that the fifth National Carbide factor (independent
agency) was not met.' Specifically, the court stated that "[i]t
would be difficult to hold that the corporation and the partner-
ship dealt with each other at arm's length. The corporation
was not compensated for the services it performed, and the
relationship truly was based upon the partners' ownership and
control of both entities ....
Despite the failure of the relationship between the nomi-
nee corporation and the partnership to meet the fifth National
Carbide factor, the Tax Court held that the nominee corpora-
49. Id at 286-88.
50. Id. at 273.
51. Id. at 268.
52. Roccforte, 77 T.C. at 264-78.
53. Id. at 287-88.
54. Id. at 286-87.
55. Id. at 287.
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tion should be treated as an agent of the partnership. The
court stated as follows:
We believe that the entire substance of the arrangement was
one of an agency relationship, and even the form (outside of
the corporation's primary liability on the mortgages) indi-
cated the agency relationship that was intended .... [Tihe
partners were forced to form a corporation in order to get
financing for their project. They sought none of the tradi-
tional insulating benefits of a corporate shareholder. In sub-
stance, the partners were the true economic owners of the
property with all the risks and benefits attendant thereto.
In such case, where the corporation was formed solely to sat-
isfy the requirement of the bank in complying with the State
usury laws and the indicia of an agency relationship are
present, we will respect the status of the corporation as an
agent of the partnership.
56
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the Tax Court
as to the weight that should be given to each of the six
National Carbide factors. The court stated:
The first four conditions set out in National Carbide are gen-
eral principles of agency law, and serve only as "relevant
considerations" in the determination of true agency status.
The fifth and sixth conditions, however, are mandatory and
absolute.... The fifth and sixth conditions are not mere fac-
tors of uncertain weight; they are prerequisites which must
be satisfied before a corporation can qualify as a true agent.
The Tax Court correctly determined that [the nominee cor-
poration] failed to satisfy the mandatory fifth condition. We
therefore conclude as a matter of law that [the nominee cor-
poration] is not a true nontaxable corporate agent.57
The Tax Court, however, was not to be denied. In Ours-
man v. Commissioner,58 the Tax Court again held that a nomi-
nee corporation should be treated as the agent of a
partnership. The facts present in Ourisman were essentially
the same as those in Roccaforte, with the following exceptions:
(1) in Ourisman, there were only two partners, both of whom
held stock in the nominee corporation; (2) the nominee corpo-
ration never opened a bank account, but instead it endorsed
loan proceeds checks to the partnership; and (3) the nominee
56. Id. at 287-88.
57. Roccaforte v. Comm'r, 708 F.2d 986, 989-90 (5th Cir. 1983).
58. 82 T.C. 171, 188 (1984), vacated, 760 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1985).
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corporation conveyed the interest in the real estate subject to
mortgage liabilities to the partnership and was dissolved after
the permanent loan was closed.59 Because Ourisman was
appealable to the Fourth Circuit rather than to the Fifth Cir-
cuit, the Tax Court followed Roccaforte and held that the facts
in Ourisman were consistent with treatment of the nominee
corporation as an agent.6°
In the alternative, the Tax Court in Ourisman took the
position that the nominee corporation could be said to have
met the fifth National Carbide factor (independent agency)
and, as a result, the relationship between the nominee corpora-
tion and the partnership complied with all six National Car-
bide factors.6' Addressing the fifth factor, the Tax Court
indicated that
[w]hen the Supreme Court stated that the corporation's rela-
tions with its principal 'must not be dependent upon the fact
that it is owned by the principal' [the Court meant only] that
any such agency must be proved by 'evidence other than the
control which shareholders automatically possess over their
corporations.' . . . In other words, the taxpayer must prove
that the agency existed independently of the shareholders'
ownership and control. In the present case, the petitioners
have sustained such burden.62
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Fifth Cir-
cuit and held that compliance with the fifth National Carbide
factor was mandatory in order to constitute the corporate nom-
inee an agent of the partnership."' The Fourth Circuit dis-
agreed with the Tax Court's alternative analysis that the fifth
National Carbide factor meant only that the agency of the
nominee corporation must be proved by evidence other than
the control that shareholders automatically possess over their
corporations."4 The court adopted a literal interpretation of
the fifth factor, holding that the nominee corporation must
demonstrate that its relations with its principal are not depen-
dent on its ownership by the principal. 65 The court then found
that the nominee corporation had not demonstrated that its
59. Id. at 172-76.
60. Id. at 185.
61. Id. at 188.
62. Id at 186.
63. Ourisman v. Comm'r, 760 F.2d 541, 547-48 (4th Cir. 1985).
64. Id. at 548.
65. Id. at 547-48.
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agency status was independent of its ownership by both of the
partners in the partnership for which it acted as agent. The
court stated as follows:
The [Tax Court] made explicit factual findings that we con-
clude, as a matter of law, preclude an agency finding under
the proscription in the fifth factor. First, the court found
that the corporation's relations with the partners were based
to some extent upon the control the partners exercised over
the corporation as shareholders. Secondly, the court found
that the partners' interests in the corporation coincided with
the partners' interests in the partnership. It also determined
that the corporation acted solely for the partnership and
received no compensation for its services. Finally, based on
the foregoing findings, the court determined that it was
unable to conclude that the corporation bargained at arm's
length with the partnership for the corporation's services as
agent.
Given the factual findings which are not clearly errone-
ous, we are unable to conclude that the corporation's rela-
tions with its principal, the partnership, were not dependent
upon the fact that the partnership owned and controlled the
corporation.w
With the decision of the Fourth Circuit in Ourisman, the
circuit courts of appeals that had considered the issue were
unanimous in holding that a nominee corporation wholly
owned by or under common control with a developer could not
be treated as an agent of the developer because compliance
with the National Carbide fifth factor (independent agency)
could not be demonstrated. 7 The agency relationship was
partly or entirely dependent on the developer's ownership or
control of the nominee.
b. Application of the Six-Factor Test to Corporations That
Are Neither Wholly Owned By Nor Under Common
Control With a Developer
While the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals appeared to
agree with the Fourth and Fifth Circuits that a nominee corpo-
ration owned and controlled by the partnership for which it
66. Id. at 548.
67. Ourisman v. Comm'r, 760 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1985); Roccaforte v. Comm'r, 708
F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983); Vaughn v. United States, 740 F.2d 941 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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acted could not be considered an agent of that partnership," it
had earlier indicated that a corporate nominee that was owned
by one of two equal partners could be treated as an agent of
the partnership.69 After the Fifth Circuit decided Roccaforte,
the Federal Circuit was again presented with the opportunity
to determine whether a nominee corporation that was not con-
trolled by the purported principal, nor by all of the partici-
pants in the purported principal, could be regarded as an agent
of the principal. In Raphan v. United States,7" the general
partner of a limited partnership owned a fifty percent interest
in the limited partnership and one hundred percent of the
stock of the nominee corporation. The nominee corporation
was to be paid the sum of $1,000 for its services in incurring
the liability for a $9.4 million construction loan and, subse-
quently, in incurring the liability for a $9.4 million permanent
loan.7 ' The Federal Circuit determined that the relations of
the nominee corporation with the limited partnership were
not, in this case, dependent on its ownership by the general
partner of the limited partnership. The court held that
because the relationship between the nominee corporation and
the limited partnership complied with the remainder of the
National Carbide factors, the nominee corporation was an
agent of the limited partnership.72
Between Roccaforte and Ourisman, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals decided Moncrief v. United States.73 The
facts in Moncrief were similar to those in both Roccaforte and
Ourisman, with one significant difference: the stock of the
nominee corporation in Moncrief was neither issued to all of
the partners in proportion to their partnership interests, nor to
the partnership. Rather, the stock of the nominee corporation
was wholly owned by the general partner of the limited part-
nership for which the nominee corporation acted as agent. In
addition, the general partner had only a twenty-five percent
interest in the limited partnership.7 4 The Fifth Circuit distin-
68. See Vaughn v. United States, 740 F.2d 941, 947 (Fed. Cir. 1984), affg 3 C1. Ct.
316 (1983).
69. See Carver v. United States, 412 F.2d 233, 240 (Cl. Ct. 1969) (the Pipkin
transaction).
70. 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985), aff'g in part and rev'g in part 3 C1. Ct. 457
(1983).
71. Id. at 881-82.
72. Id. at 884.
73. 730 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1984).
74. Id. at 278.
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guished its earlier decision in Roccaforte, holding that the fifth
National Carbide factor (independent agency) could be and
was satisfied in Moncrief because the general partner, who
held only a twenty-five percent interest in the partnership,
owned all of the stock of the corporate nominee.75
Subsequently, the Tax Court heard Frink v. Commis-
sioner,76 a case that was appealable to both the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits and that involved facts similar to those in Rocca-
forte and Ourisman. In Frink, the court held that a corporate
nominee was an agent of a limited partnership because the
fifth National Carbide factor could be and was complied with.77
The Tax Court reasoned that this factor was satisfied because
the stock of the nominee corporation was not held by the lim-
ited partnership for which the nominee corporation acted as
agent, nor by the partners in the limited partnership in propor-
tion to their partnership interests.71 In fact, the general part-
ner of the limited partnership, who owned sixty-two to eighty
percent of the limited partnership, only owned fifty percent of
the stock of the nominee corporation. The other fifty percent
of the stock of the nominee corporation was owned by the gen-
eral partner's spouse.79
The Fourth Circuit in Frink 80 and the Fifth Circuit in
George v. Commissioner,8" declined to follow the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision in Moncrief because the owner of the corporate
nominee in Moncrief had only a twenty-five percent general
partner interest in the partnership. Both the Fourth and the
Fifth Circuits also distinguished the Federal Circuit's decision
in Raphan, reasoning that, in Raphan, the owner of one hun-
dred percent of the corporate nominee had only a fifty percent
interest in the limited partnership. In contrast, the general
partner in Frink always held more than a fifty percent interest
in the limited partnership. In addition, there had been no
showing that the general partner was unable to control the
75. Id. at 284.
76. 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 386 (1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part 798 F.2d 106 (4th
Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded 485 U.S. 973 (1988), on remand Tax Ct. aff'd 846 F.2d
5 (4th Cir. 1988).
77. Id. at 397-98.
78. Id. at 398.
79. Id.
80. 798 F.2d 106, 109 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded 485 U.S. 973 (1988), on
remand Tax Ct. aff'd 846 F.2d 5 (4th Cir. 1988).
81. 803 F.2d 144, 149 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded 485 U.S. 973 (1988), on
remand Tax Ct. aff'd 844 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1988).
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nominee corporation as a result of only having a fifty percent
interest in it.
8 2
In Frink and George, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits found
that the nominee corporation's relationship with the limited
partnership was dependent on the general partner's ownership
of the nominee corporation, his majority interest in the part-
nership, and his position as a general partner. Therefore, the
fifth National Carbide factor, which required that the agency
relationship be independent of the ownership of the corporate
nominee, had not been complied with, and the nominee corpo-
ration could not be treated as an agent of the limited partner-
ship.83 As a result of Frink and George, it appeared that, in at
least the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, in cases with facts similar
to Roccaforte and Ourisman, if a party controlled the nominee
corporation and had a fifty percent or less interest in the part-
nership for which the corporate nominee acts as agent, the
relationship could comply with the National Carbide fifth fac-
tor. If, however, the party who controlled the corporate nomi-
nee held an interest greater than fifty percent in the
partnership for which the corporate nominee acted as agent,
the National Carbide fifth factor could not be complied with.
III. BOLLINGER REPLACES THE SIX-FACTOR TEST
A. Bollinger in the Lower Courts
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bollinger v. Com-
missioner"4 it appeared that a wholly owned, majority owned,
or commonly controlled nominee corporation could not be
treated as the agent of a developer because compliance with
the National Carbide fifth factor could not be demonstrated.
8 5
The taxpayer could not show that the agency relationship was
independent of this direct or indirect ownership of the nomi-
nee by the developer. On the other hand, if the nominee cor-
poration was not controlled by the developer or by the holder
of a majority interest in the developer, the fifth National Car-
bide factor might be complied with. 6
Following Raphan and Moncrief, and prior to Frink and
82. Frink, 798 F.2d at 109; George, 803 F.2d at 148.
83. Frink, 798 F.2d at 110; George, 803 F.2d at 148.
84. 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1443 (1984), aff'd 807 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd 485 U.S.
340 (1988).
85. See supra part II.B.2.a.
86. See supra part II.B.2.b.
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George, the Tax Court decided Bollinger v. Commissioner.8 7
The Tax Court determined that the facts in Bollinger were
indistinguishable from the facts in Roccaforte and Ourisman,M
with the exception that Mr. Bollinger owned, in almost all
cases, one hundred percent of the corporate nominee and held
a variety of interests in the various principals for which the
nominee corporation acted as the agent.8 9 Bollinger involved
eight apartment projects, of which Mr. Bollinger was the sole
proprietor of two, and held 66 2/3 percent of the partnership
that owned one, 50 percent of the partnerships that owned
three, and 33 1/3 percent of the partnerships that owned two.
The same corporate nominee, Creekside, Inc., acted as the
agent for seven of these projects. Another corporate nominee,
Cloisters, Inc., acted as agent for one of the projects in which
Mr. Bollinger had a 50 percent interest. Mr. Bollinger owned
100 percent of the stock of Creekside, Inc., and 50 percent of
the stock of Cloisters, Inc. The other 50 percent of the stock of
Cloisters, Inc., was held by Mr. Bollinger's 50 percent partner
in the partnership for which Cloisters, Inc., acted as the
agent.90
While the Tax Court recognized that the agency status of
the nominee corporations could be made to turn on whether
the ownership interests in the corporate nominee were held in
the same proportions as the ownership interests in the project
for which the corporate nominee acted as agent, the court
chose to take the same position with respect to the National
Carbide factors that it had taken in Roccaforte and Ouris-
man.9 ' The Tax Court held that none of the National Carbide
factors is mandatory and absolute.92 The court then deter-
mined that Creekside, Inc., complied with all six of the
National Carbide factors.9 3 With respect to the fifth National
Carbide factor (independent agency), the Tax Court stated:
Although Creekside, Inc., was not compensated for the serv-
ices it performed, because in at least five developments the
partners did not own the stock of the corporation in the
87. 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1443 (1984), aff'd 807 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd 485 U.S.
340 (1988).
88. Id. at 1450.
89. Id. at 1446.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1452.
92. Bollinger, 48 T.C.M. at 1450.
93. Id. at 1450-52.
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same percentage as their partnership interest, we believe
that the agency relationship was not based upon the part-
ners' ownership and control of both entities. . . . With
respect to Cloisters, Inc., in which the partners' ownership
and control of both entities was in the same proportion, we
must conclude that the corporate-agent's relationship with
the partnership was dependent on the fact of common own-
ership and control. However, Cloisters, Inc., like Creekside,
Inc., was acting as an agent for the partnership because it
carried on only negligible activities, all persons dealing with
it were aware it was acting as an agent, and the substantial
activities involved in constructing and operating the building
were performed by the partners. Since the corporations
acted no differently than independent agents, they should be
recognized for tax purposes as such.94
In determining the agency status of Cloisters, Inc., the Tax
Court appears to have also relied on the alternative analysis of
the fifth National Carbide factor, which it had initially devel-
oped in Ourisman. In short, the Tax Court held that the fifth
National Carbide factor was not absolute and mandatory, and
that nominee corporations could be considered agents even
though the fifth factor was not complied with. 5 In the alter-
native, however, the Tax Court took the position that the fifth
National Carbide factor was complied with in this case.' The
Tax Court held that the fifth factor required only that the
agency status of the nominee corporations be proved by evi-
dence other than the control that shareholders automatically
possess over their corporations.97 The Tax Court concluded
that the agency status of both Creekside, Inc., and Cloisters,
Inc., existed independently of the shareholders' ownership and
control of these corporations.98
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the
Tax Court. 9 The court did not take a position with respect to
whether the fifth National Carbide factor was mandatory and
absolute or simply one of a series of factors.1 0° The court did,
however, agree with the Tax Court's alternative analysis that
the requirements of the fifth National Carbide factor could be
94. Id. at 1451 (citations omitted).
95. See id. at 1450-51.
96. Id.
97. Bollinger, 48 T.C.M. at 1451.
98. Id.
99. Bollinger v. Comm'r, 807 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd 485 U.S. 340 (1988).
100. See id. at 68.
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satisfied when the corporate nominee acted no differently than
an independent agent would have acted if the agent had bar-
gained at arm's length with its principal for its services.' 01 The
court held that both Creekside, Inc., and Cloisters, Inc., acted
no differently than an independent agent would have acted if
the agent had bargained at arm's length with its principal for
its services. 10 2 Therefore, both Creekside, Inc., and Cloisters,
Inc., were treated as agents by the Sixth Circuit.
B. The Supreme Court Decision and Its Ramifications
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bollinger to
resolve the conflict between the Sixth Circuit and the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits. 03 After Bollinger, under essentially the
same facts, a corporate nominee would be held an agent in the
Sixth Circuit, but not in the Fourth or Fifth Circuit."°4
The taxpayer in Bollinger must have hoped that the
Supreme Court would hold that the fifth National Carbide fac-
tor was not mandatory and absolute or, if it was, that its
requirements could be satisfied by demonstrating that the cor-
porate nominee acted no differently than an independent agent
would have acted if the agent had bargained at arm's length
with its principal for its services. The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice must have hoped that the Supreme Court would hold that
the fifth National Carbide factor was mandatory and absolute
and that, as held by the Fourth Circuit in Ourisman, it liter-
ally required that the nominee corporation demonstrate that
its relations with its principal were not in any way dependent
on its ownership by the principal or by participants in the
principal. 10 5
The Supreme Court did not fulfill either of these hopes.
Instead of deciding how the fifth factor should be applied, it
replaced the entire six-factor test with a simplified test consist-
ing of only three elements. The Court stated as follows:
In any case, we decline to parse the text of National Carbide
as though that were itself the governing statute.... [W]e
agree that it is reasonable for the Commissioner to demand
unequivocal evidence of genuineness in the corporation-
101. Id. at 69.
102. Id.
103. Comm'r v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340, 341 (1988).
104. See supra part I.B.2.a.
105. See Ourisman v. Comm'r, 760 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1985).
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shareholder context.... We see no basis, however, for hold-
ing that unequivocal evidence can only consist of the rigid
requirements (arm's-length dealing plus agency fee) that the
Commissioner suggests.... It seems to us that the genuine-
ness of the agency relationship is adequately assured, and
tax-avoiding manipulation adequately avoided, when the fact
that the corporation is acting as agent for its shareholders
with respect to a particular asset is set forth in a written
agreement at the time the asset is acquired, the corporation
functions as agent and not principal with respect to the asset
for all purposes, and the corporation is held out as the agent
and not principal in all dealings with third parties relating to
the asset. Since these requirements were met here, the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed."°
Thus, according to the Supreme Court's decision in Bollin-
ger, whether a nominee corporation acts as an agent in a situa-
tion in which its shareholder is the principal, or its
shareholders are owners of interests in the principal, is deter-
mined by the proponent of agency status demonstrating the
following: (1) that the nominee corporation acts as an agent
with respect to a particular asset pursuant to a written agree-
ment that was in existence at the time the asset was acquired;
(2) that the nominee corporation functions for all purposes as
the agent and not as the principal with respect to the asset; and
(3) that the nominee corporation is held out as the agent and
not the principal in all dealings with third parties relating to
the asset.10 7
With this new simplified test in place, the ownership or
control of the nominee corporation by the developer is no
longer an overriding consideration. The Bollinger approach
removes, for the practitioner, the uncertainties inherent in the
conflicting views of the National Carbide test and the applica-
tion of the fifth factor. The test adopted by the Supreme Court
in Bollinger makes it possible for planners to use nominee cor-
porations with confidence that the desired tax results can be
achieved if the appropriate steps are taken.
IV. COMPLYING wiTH BOLLINGER
The three elements set forth in Bollinger provide a
roadmap for practitioners seeking to organize and use nominee
106. Bollinger, 485 U.S. at 349-50 (emphasis in original).
107. Id.
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corporations that will be treated as agents for tax purposes.
First, the nominee corporation's agency status with regard to a
particular asset must be set out in a written agreement prior to
the acquisition of the asset.1 08 This can be accomplished by the
nominee corporation entering into agency agreements and
adopting corporate resolutions both of which clearly indicate
that the corporation's sole business is acting as an agent. All
other corporate documents and transactions should be consis-
tent with the agency status of the nominee corporation.
Second, the nominee corporation must function as an
agent and not as a principal for all purposes relating to the
asset.' 1 Toward this end, the planner should take the follow-
ing steps: (1) the articles of incorporation of the nominee cor-
poration should limit the corporate powers so that they may be
exercised only in an agency capacity; (2) the corporate nomi-
nee's agreements with the principal should not grant the nomi-
nee corporation any discretionary authority and should only
allow it to act upon the written direction of the principal; (3)
the agency agreement and relationship should be terminable
upon notice from the principal, and, upon termination, legal
title should be transferred to the principal or at the principal's
direction; and (4) all income and expenses with respect to the
property for which the nominee corporation is the agent
should be paid to and out of bank accounts owned by the prin-
cipal, and the only amounts passing through the nominee cor-
poration's bank account, if any, should be the fees it receives
for acting as agent and any amounts which it pays out in the
course of its business as an agent.
Third, the nominee corporation must be held out as agent
and not as principal in all dealings with third parties."0 In
other words, all third parties, including lenders, should be
aware of the agency status of the nominee corporation."'
While compliance with the above suggestions should result
in a corporate nominee being treated as an agent under the
Bollinger test, absolute certainty might be achieved if, in addi-
tion to those steps, the nominee corporation is not owned or
controlled by the principal and there is little or no overlap
between the shareholders of the nominee corporation and the
108. Id. at 349.
109. Id. at 349-50.
110. Id. at 350.
111. See generally Kurtz & Kopp, supra note 1.
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owners of interests in the principal. Lastly, the operations of
the nominee corporation should reflect the steps described
above and the limitation that the nominee corporation can only
act as an agent for others.1 2
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Bollinger held that a nominee cor-
poration can act as agent for its shareholders if the following
elements are present in the agency relationship: First, there
must be a written agreement providing that the nominee cor-
poration acts as an agent for its shareholders with respect to a
particular asset. This agreement must be in existence at the
time the asset is acquired. Second, the nominee corporation
must function, for all purposes, as an agent and not as a princi-
pal with respect to the asset. Third, the nominee corporation
must be held out as an agent and not as a principal in all deal-
ings with third parties relating to the asset."
3
If the formation, corporate documents, agreements, duties,
and operations of a nominee corporation comply with the three
elements set out in Bollinger, a nominee corporation that is
used to avoid state usury limits applicable to individuals and
partnerships will be treated as an agent for income tax pur-
poses. Will compliance with the Bollinger elements, however,
result in a state court determining that a loan made to the
nominee corporation should be treated as having been made to
its principal, especially if the principal guarantees the loan?
The result of such a determination by a state court may be that
the corporate exception from usury limits is not available."
4
On the other hand, in the words of the Supreme Court in Bol-
linger, "[i]t might well be thought that the borrower does not
generally require usury protection in a transaction sophisti-
cated enough to employ a corporate agent--assuredly not the
normal modus operandi of the loan shark.""' 5
A nominee corporation that complies with the three ele-
ments required by Bollinger can be used to disguise the iden-
tity of the principal when acquiring the real estate needed for
a project. The nominee corporation used for this purpose cer-
112. Id
113. See supra part III.B.
114. See generally Note, Incorporation to Avoid the Usury Laws, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 1390 (1968).
115. Bollinger, 485 U.S. at 348.
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tainly can be subject to an agency agreement. It can function
at all times as an agent and be held out as an agent in all deal-
ings, even with the owners of the real estate to be acquired. In
the context of the negotiations with the owners of the real
estate to be acquired, it can be held out as an agent for an
undisclosed principal.
Can a nominee corporation comply with the Bollinger ele-
ments and be used to limit the liability of its principal or prin-
cipals with respect to a loan from an institutional lender for
the acquisition, development, or operation of real estate?
While a nominee corporation used for this purpose can be sub-
ject to a written agreement to act as an agent, if it is used to
avoid the liability of the principal, can it be said to be function-
ing as the principal with respect to the loan and the lender
that made the loan?116 In general, a nominee corporation used
for the purpose of limiting the liability of the nominee's prin-
cipal or principals can not be disregarded. The borrowing by
the nominee corporation is enough activity to require the nom-
inee's treatment as an entity independent of its principal." 7
On the other hand, in almost all situations, a lender will know
that a nominee corporation is being used to avoid the liability
of its principal or principals."' Because the lender is aware of
the purpose of the nominee corporation, assuming it does not
object, the lender might agree in the lending documents that,
despite the status of the nominee corporation as an agent, the
lender looks solely to the personal liability of the nominee cor-
116. See Frink v. Comm'r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 386, 396-97 (1984), off'd in part and
rev'd in part 798 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded 485 U.S. 973 (1988)
(considering the status of the nominee corporation Coastal Golf, Inc.).
117. See Paymer v. Comm'r, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945); Frink, 49 T.C.M. at 386.
118. A nominee corporation might be used, with the lender's knowledge, to avoid
the personal liability of a limited partnership for a loan in a situation in which a
limited partnership is a developer of a real estate project. The partners, particularly
the limited partners, will want neither the partnership nor any partner to have
personal liability for the loan so that the limited partners can add a portion of the loan
to their bases in their partnership interests. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.752-1(a)(2), 1.752-3(a)
(1990). The lender, if it is adequately secured, may agree that it will not require the
partnership or any partner to have personal liability for the loan. The lender,
however, may question whether a nonrecourse note or a mortgage securing a
nonrecourse note is enforceable under state law. As a result, the lender may seek the
personal liability of the nominee corporation. For example, the lender and the limited
partnership may agree that the nominee corporation will borrow the money from the
lender, sign the note, and convey the mortgage to the lender. Subsequently, the
nominee corporation will convey the real estate subject to the mortgage to the limited
partnership.
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poration and to the real estate subject to the mortgage given to
the lender as security for its loan.
While, as pointed out above, some problems continue to
exist with respect to the use of nominee corporations, the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in Bollinger has nevertheless sim-
plified the area and set guidelines for the use of nominee
corporations.
